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ABSTRACT 
The EU budget has only recently started to feature in theories of European integration. 
Studies typically adopt a historical-institutionalist framework, exploring notions such 
as path dependency. They have, however, generally been rather aggregated, or coarse-
grained, in their approach. The EU budget has thus been treated as a single entity 
rather than a series of inter-linked institutions. This paper seeks to address these 
lacunae by adopting a fine-grained approach. This enables us to emphasise the 
connections that exist between EU budgetary institutions, in both time and space. We 
show that the initial set of budgetary institutions was unable, over time, to achieve 
consistently their Treaty-based objectives. In response, rather than reform these 
institutions at potentially high political cost, additional institutions were layered on 
top of the extant structures. We thus demonstrate how some EU budgetary institutions 
have remained unchanged, whilst others have been added or changed over time. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The development of the EU budget system has never featured prominently in 
theories of European integration. Only recently, with contributions such as Laffan 
(2000) and Lindner and Rittberger (2003), has this lacuna started to be addressed. 
Moreover, a special edition of this journal in December 2003 set the development of 
the current EU budgetary system as one of the key explananda for theories of 
institutional change in the EU (Stacey and Rittberger 2003; Lindner 2003). 
In this paper, we use the term “institution” to mean “either a single or complex 
set of rules which govern the interaction of political actors, i.e. guiding principles 
which both prescribe and proscribe behaviour and are set out in the form of 
prescriptions – either formally established or tacitly understood.” (Stacey and 
Rittberger, 2003, p. 860). This contrasts with the more general use of ‘institution’ to 
mean “[o]rganizations [that] constitute collective political actors” (ibid) – such as the 
main decision-making bodies of the EU: Commission, European Parliament and 
Council of Ministers. Indeed, this latter usage is seen in the term ‘Interinstitutional 
Agreement’, an element of the EU Budget we discuss later. 
It is common for historical institutionalism to utilise the concept of path 
dependency as a way of explaining institutional persistence and stability across time. 
This, in turn, is underpinned theoretically by the economic notion of increasing 
returns (see, inter alia, Pierson 2000; 2004). However, path dependency does not 
model explicitly the possibility of institutional change when these self-reinforcing, 
positive feedback1 processes break down or there is a change in the environment in 
which actors find themselves. As such, historical institutionalism has struggled to 
reconcile stability and change in institutions. 
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In this paper we integrate and develop a number of emerging theoretical 
elements around the coexistence of continuity and change in institutions, emphasising 
the importance of the granularity of perspective and adopting a fine-grained lens with 
which to analyse a policy framework consisting of a matrix of interdependent 
institutions. We thus explore more fully than previous papers the relationship between 
institutions within the matrix. In so doing, we propose a way of reconciling one aspect 
of institutional stability and change. By referring to the notion of institutional layering 
(see, inter alia, Thelen, 2003; Streeck and Thelen, 2004), we distinguish between 
individual institutions (or ‘rules’) and a matrix of institutions (or ‘policy framework’). 
Changing or introducing new individual institutions may not necessarily change the 
trajectory of the overall institutional matrix. 
We then apply these ideas to the development of the EU Budget, starting from 
the initial budgetary institutions established in the Treaty of Rome. Our fine-grained 
analysis then sees us offering a different narrative explanation of the development of 
the budget system to other work in this area (see, inter alia, Lindner, 2003). We 
highlight the limitations of the initial budgetary institutions that, although allowing 
the EU Budget to function for many years, ultimately proved inadequate to sustain the 
goals intended of them. We show how these shortcomings were addressed over time. 
Additional institutions were agreed by the political actors of the EU and layered into 
the EU budgetary matrix, paradoxically, to preserve this matrix by ensuring respect 
for one key institution, the Balanced Budget Rule (BBR). 
Moreover, we distinguish between static and dynamic institutions and show 
that, as these came into conflict over time within the institutional matrix, pressures 
arose for institutional change (or, more strictly, institutional development – see 
Pierson, 2004, p. 133). That is, the pressures leading to institutional change were 
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endogenous to the EU Budget. This stands in contrast to the situation where “[c]ritical 
junctures are often attributed to big, exogenous shocks” (Pierson, 2004, p. 135, 
emphasis added) – although Thelen (2003, p 213) also acknowledges the possibility 
of endogenous shocks. This responds to Pierson‘s concern over “the paucity of claims 
about when we should expect institutional change to occur” (Pierson, 2004, p. 139, 
emphasis added). 
In Sections 2 and 3 we elaborate on the ideas of path dependency and 
institutional layering. Sections 4 and 5 utilise this framework, enhanced by 
categorising key institutions as either domain constraints or procedural constraints 
(Buchanan and Musgrave, 1999) to explain the development of the EU budget system. 
We emphasise the accumulation of additional, complementary institutions that 
ensured the goals of the initial Treaty-based EU budgetary institutions were – and 
continue to be – respected. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND PATH DEPENDENCY 
Much analysis within the historical institutionalist literature takes a macro perspective 
in which there is a single unitary ‘whole’, usually the institutional configuration, as 
the unit of analysis. Path dependency, in explaining institutional persistence and 
stability, then insists on an ‘overall’ trajectory for the institutional configuration, the 
direction of which is reinforced after early moves in the sequence: “Path dependent 
processes will typically generate coarse-grained patterns of outcomes rather than fine-
grained ones” (Pierson, 2004, p. 50).  As elaborated below, this can be problematic as 
it can create too sharp a distinction between stability and change (see for example Hay 
and Wincott 1998; Lindner, 2003; Thelen 2003). 
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Path dependency is given theoretical underpinnings by reference to the 
economic notion of increasing returns (see, inter alia, Pierson 2000; 2004). The 
sequence of institutional choices over time increase the payoffs for certain choices 
further on in the sequence. North (1990, p. 95), moreover, states that it is ‘the 
interdependent web of an institutional matrix that produces massive increasing 
returns’ through strong learning effects, co-ordination effects and adaptive 
expectations. Crucially, it is not the choice of a single institution at one point in time 
that persists or is stable. 
Institutional change occurs when the self-reinforcing, positive feedback 
processes, break down. It has, however, proved difficult to reconcile institutional 
stability as implied by path dependency with institutional change as implied by 
‘policy reform’. We posit this difficulty has arisen because the notion of ‘institution’ 
has been conflated with the notion of the wider matrix of institutions that constitutes a 
‘policy framework’. By adopting a fine-grained framework for policy analysis, we 
separate analytically the individual institutions from the overall institutional matrix. 
We may thus distinguish between stability or change in individual institutions and 
stability or change at the level of the policy framework or institutional matrix. 
The concept of path dependency has been adopted increasingly in studies of 
EU integration (for example Holzinger and Knill 2002; Dimitrakopoulos 2001). It has 
a clear and obvious appeal in terms of explaining the development of the EU budget 
system where the Balanced Budget Rule (BBR), set out in the 1957 Treaty of Rome, 
and the 1970 Luxembourg Treaty distinction between Compulsory Expenditure (CE) 
and Non-Compulsory Expenditure (NCE) have persisted unchanged. 
We hold that, with the EU Budget, the positive feedback process operates at 
the level of sequences of institutional choices within the institutional matrix. Once the 
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initial budgetary framework was established, strong self-reinforcing mechanisms 
(elaborated upon in Sections 4 and 5) influenced member states’ decisions over 
individual institutions. One such mechanism arises from the existence of significant 
switching costs. Replacing existing constitutionally-entrenched budgetary institutions 
would be costly politically: Treaty changes require unanimous agreement by the 
member states, giving potential ‘losers’ a veto, whilst changes in budget rules tend to 
be a zero-sum game (as explained below). In such a game, positive switching costs 
must represent a net loss for the member states. This addresses an important point 
made by Thelen (quoted in Pierson 2004, p. 49), that in order to understand the policy 
choices being made, “we need to know exactly who is invested in particular 
institutional arrangements”. In Sections 4 and 5 we identify the EU ‘organizations’ 
invested in the EU budgetary institutional matrix and consider why they agreed the 
institutional developments they did. 
Labelling the BBR and CE as path dependent is, however, only a partial 
analysis. They represent ‘foundational institutions’ within the EU budgetary matrix, 
into which member states subsequently layered complementary institutions. This was 
required because the BBR was not self-sustaining: problems arose for the EU budget 
when, driven by CE, spending rose towards, then beyond, total available resources.2 
The new institutions thus co-ordinated spending and revenue decisions to ensure the 
BBR be respected. 
These additional institutions were also agreed because each member state had 
an interest in preserving their net budget position. Independently, each would wish to 
maximise their budgetary transfers but, given national vetoes and the zero sum nature 
of the EU Budget game, protecting budget shares (an analysis of which is presented 
below) represents the best outcome for the member states collectively. Member states’ 
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preferences with regard to budget share stability and respecting the BBR therefore 
define a domain of feasible compromise for the development of the additional EU 
budgetary institutions that confirm or validate the initial, Treaty-based institutions. 
 
3. THE LAYERING OF INSTITUTIONS 
The foregoing discussion showed how adopting a fine-grained perspective enhances 
the application of path dependency. It is also an important part of any discussion of 
the layering of institutions, as it allows us to show how institutions exist in 
combinations: they are interdependent, with contingent relationships. As Thelen 
(2003, p. 233) argues, ”…to understand how institutions evolve, it may be more 
fruitful to aim for a more fine-grained analysis that seeks to identify what aspects of a 
specific institutional configuration are (or are not) negotiable and under what 
conditions.” 
Our work, however, adapts the idea of layering in one important respect. 
Streeck and Thelen (2005, p. 31) suggest layering occurs when “[n]ew elements 
attached to existing institutions gradually change their status and structure”. In 
contrast, we argue that new institutions were introduced into the EU budget matrix in 
order to preserve both key individual institutions and the institutional matrix. 
Furthermore, by this fine-grained perspective we can highlight the inter-institutional 
relationships, through which the positive-feedback mechanisms, central to the 
historical institutionalist perspective, will operate. 
To clarify further our analysis of institutional development, we also 
distinguish between the spatial and temporal layering of institutions. The most 
prominent spatial interpretation of layering is the relationship between different levels 
of institutions. Three levels or layers are regularly distinguished: the macro or 
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constitutional-level; the collective choice or policy decision-level; and the operational 
level of individual decisions. Within this institutional matrix, however, constitutional 
rules can affect policy decision rules, which in turn can affect operational decisions, 
whilst other constitutional and collective choice rules are subject to the control of 
operational-level decisions. In this paper we associate these three levels with, 
respectively, EU decision-making on budgetary matters, the institutional matrix of the 
EU Budget and individual budgetary institutions. 
Ostrom (1999, p. 38) argues that “the nested structure of rules within rules, 
within still further rules, is a particularly difficult analytical problem to solve for those 
interested in the study of institutions.” We thus use the concept of a configural 
relationship to describe this nested interdependency or institutional layering: each 
relationship between policy rules within a multi-level system cannot accurately be 
studied independently, because a change in one may affect the others i.e. ceteris 
paribus does not hold. 
Configurations can be defined as a multivariate combination of many variables 
having emergent properties. The EU budget process is an emergent property of the 
relationship between different actors and budgetary institutions across time. 
Understanding the layering of EU budgetary institutions requires understanding the 
relationship between the initial Treaty-based rules and the complementary institutions 
agreed subsequently by budgetary actors. We explain below how critical junctures 
emerged through pressures endogenous to the EU budgetary process, leading to new 
institutions being agreed that complemented and reinforced the initial budgetary 
framework. 
To this end, temporal layering is important because it raises questions of 
inherited legacies and the extent to which institutions, as artefacts of past decisions or 
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actions, condition a particular institutional space in which parallel or related 
institutions may be introduced. Specifically, whilst political actors remain capable of 
remaking or reforming these inheritances, historical institutionalism emphasises the 
common difficulties of such a task. Further, institutions may have consequences that 
bear little relationship to their designers’ initial intentions. Again, as shown below, 
our fine-grained approach helps clarify some of these difficulties. 
In discussing the EU budget, we also pick up the gauntlet laid down by 
Pierson (2004, p. 162), about developing research on the “interaction effects among 
multiple institutions”. Specifically, in addition to identifying multiple institutions 
existing within a single institutional matrix, we interpret Pierson’s notion of 
“institutional coupling” as meaning institutions that exist within two separate but 
complementary institutional matrixes. We argue that because ‘Compulsory 
Expenditure’ exists within EU budgetary institutional space and Common 
Agricultural Policy institutional space, the 1992 CAP reform that changed the de facto 
meaning of CE was also a profoundly important institutional development for the EU 
Budget. 
 
4. THE INITIAL DESIGN OF THE EU BUDGET SYSTEM 
Following Buchanan and Musgrave (1999) we identify two types of budgetary 
institution. Procedural constraints affect the rules for reaching collective decisions; 
whilst domain constraints affect “the set of permissible outcomes or solutions that 
may be allowed under any agreed-on procedures” (p. 118). In this section we explain 
these concepts in the context of the EU budget. In Section 5 we show how a key 
procedural constraint, the definition and nature of CE, eventually came into direct 
conflict with the main Treaty-based domain constraint, the BBR. This conflict 
 9
P
st-Pri t
between institutions resulted in a series of reforms, culminating in the CAP reform of 
1992. As already noted, this reform changed the de facto nature of CE. Crucially, 
however, the de jure definition was left unchanged. This reform, therefore, did not 
require a change to the Treaty. The configural nature of these accumulated 
interdependent institutions is elaborated upon below. 
 
4.1 Domain constraints 
The 1957 Treaty of Rome set out the basic framework for EU budget-making. The 
most important domain constraint originating from the Treaty was a Balanced Budget 
Rule (BBR), set out in Article 199 (now 268): “the revenue and expenditure shown in 
the budget shall be in balance” each year. The was included because the Treaty 
authors “did not wish to offer the Communities, and in particular the Commission, 
any easy solutions” on spending (Strasser 1992, p. 57). This credible commitment to 
financial restraint addressed a potential time inconsistency problem, binding on both 
those signing the Treaty of Rome and their successors (see also Pierson, 2004, pp. 
144-145). 
Article 200 (now removed) set out transitional funding arrangements for the 
EU budget, with scaled national contributions for different spending areas.3 The 
“Decision of 21 April 1970” then replaced these transitional arrangements with “own 
resources” (OR), as required by Article 201. This Article named only the Common 
Customs Tariff (CCT), but the 1970 agreement confirmed also the Variable Import 
Levy of the CAP as an OR. Insufficient by themselves to cover EU spending, a third 
OR was agreed, based on VAT. The member states agreed the “Sixth VAT Directive” 
in 1977, but its incorporation into national law was delayed in some countries. Some 
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countries began VAT-based contributions in 1978, others in 1979. In the interim, 
national contributions continued to be based on the GNP key in Article 200. 
The Sixth Directive established a common basis for applying VAT. VAT OR 
contributions are then based on a two-stage calculation. First, the VAT ‘base’ is 
determined as the total revenue that each country would collect were the Sixth VAT 
Directive to be implemented. Payments to the EU budget are then specified as a 
percentage of the VAT base (the ‘call-up rate’) capped, initially, at 1%. Combined 
with finite VIL and CCT revenues, the value of spending that would ensure respect 
for the BBR was thus fixed. 
 
4.2 Procedural constraints 
The Treaty of Luxembourg of 22 April 1970 amended Article 203 of the Treaty of 
Rome, introducing a distinction between two classes of expenditure, Compulsory 
Expenditure (CE) and Non-Compulsory Expenditure (NCE). Compulsory 
Expenditure (CE) is spending “necessarily resulting from this Treaty or from acts 
adopted in accordance herewith” (Article 203). During the 1975 budget process, the 
first applying this distinction, the Council of Ministers determined that CE was “all 
expenditure ‘in respect of which, by virtue of existing enactments, no budgetary 
authority, be it the Council or the European Parliament, has the right freely to 
determine the appropriations.’” (Strasser 1992, p. 176). NCE is thus spending “other 
than that necessarily resulting from this Treaty or from acts adopted in accordance 
herewith” (Article 203). 
 The crucial distinction between CE and NCE concerns the powers granted 
over each to the Parliament. It thus reflects the political fallout from the Empty-Chair 
Crisis of 1965-66. The Council’s 1975 statement implies that CE cannot be controlled 
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directly – once expenditure-generating policies are agreed, all resulting expenditure 
obligations must be met. That said, because CE is dominated by CAP ‘Guarantee’ 
expenditures, the institution with the greatest say over CAP policy-making has 
indirect control over CE: that institution is the Council. This also helps explain why 
the CAP has seen the fewest powers granted by the member states to the Parliament 
under ‘co-decision’. We thus address a concern of Thelen (quoted in Pierson 2004, p. 
49) over the ‘vested interests’ argument for path dependency, that “we need to 
know…how those who are not invested in the institutions are kept out.” 
Additionally, two related domain constraints were imposed on the Parliament. 
Article 203 limited the annual growth rate of NCE, set by the Commission with 
reference to prevailing economic conditions.4 Parliament’s de facto budgetary 
influence was limited still further because, initially, NCE represented less than 5% of 
total EU spending (it is now about 50%). 
 
4.3 The Limitations of the ‘Foundational Institutions’ 
A BBR does not necessarily need an additional spending limit defined; this is 
provided by the total tax base. A tighter spending limit, however, reflected the 
concern of “easy [spending] solutions” described by Strasser and was, in turn, 
reflected in the limited fiscal functions assigned to the EU from and by the member 
states (see also Ackrill, 2003). Even so, the BBR remained vulnerable to the impact of 
spending decisions, especially those taken by the Council of Agriculture Ministers 
(CoAM). As described below, ‘open-ended’ CAP support saw CE grow, leading to 
the breaching of the BBR. Other institutions were thus agreed by the member states to 
reinforce the initial BBR domain constraint, through institutional layering. We see 
later how none of the foundational institutions within the initial institutional matrix of 
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the EU budget enforced the BBR directly. We also offer an explanation as to why the 
member states chose to preserve the BR rather than seek to change it. 
In understanding the evolution of the EU budgetary institutional matrix, it is 
important to note that the BBR and own-resources system combined to ensure that 
negotiations between member states in the Council on changes to budget rules or the 
introduction of new rules, were a zero-sum game. Member states had two main 
preferences in terms of the outcome from institutional change: to maximise their net 
budgetary position and to ensure their shares of budget transfers were stable over 
time. Given that negotiations were zero-sum, institutional change satisfying the first 
preference for all member states was infeasible, whereas institutions that achieved the 
second preference were possible. 
The data presented in Tables 1 and 2 show a simple analysis of member states’ 
shares of EU budgetary transfers. They indicate increasingly stable net shares for 
most member states. The Coefficient of Variation of own resource shares fell for 
almost all member states after the introduction of new budgetary institutions after 
1988 (Table 1). A similar picture is seen for expenditures following the 1992 CAP 
reform (Table 2). This latter reform was crucial for the Budget as it changed the 
impact on spending growth of Compulsory Expenditure. 
 
[Insert Tables 1-2 hereabouts] 
 
5. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EU BUDGET SYSTEM, 1970-PRESENT 
The initial EU budget system was defined by a set of rules consisting of, notably, the 
BBR, the limit on own resources available for spending and the definition of 
Compulsory Expenditure. The subsequent problems faced by the EU budget were 
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then caused by a ‘static’ BBR but ‘dynamic’ CE. The CAP and its expenditure were 
not part of the initial design of the budget system, but were established through the 
1960s, with CE defined in 1970. How, though, was CE ‘dynamic’ and how did this 
threaten the BBR? 
Price support, the dominant form of CAP support until 1992, maintained EU 
market prices at levels higher than prices in the rest of the world. The associated 
policy instruments had various consequences for the EU budget. Imports were 
prevented from entering the EU below a minimum import (threshold) price by means 
of a Variable Import Levy, which then passed to the EU budget. Exports to third 
countries, however, required subsidies from the EU budget to bridge the gap between 
EU and world market prices. 
High prices stimulated EU production, driving down the EU market price. A 
system of intervention storage was thus established, so that if the market price fell 
below a certain level, farmers could receive a guaranteed minimum price by selling to 
the government instead. The associated costs were also paid by the EU budget. 
Moreover, the higher market price would only translate into higher revenues if 
farmers could sell their produce. Intervention guaranteed a buyer and was therefore 
central to farmers having an incentive to produce more. Price support thus drove up 
production, surpluses and budget costs year-on-year. Moreover, higher EU production 
reduced imports, reducing VIL revenues to the EU budget. 
Given the definition of CE, the EU could not stop exporting or storing 
surpluses just because spending was rising. The only way to alter the trajectory of 
CAP spending was to change the expenditure-inducing policy instruments, that is, 
reform the CAP. It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyse CAP reforms in 
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detail.5 We do, however, discuss later the reforms of those agricultural institutions 
that are also located within the EU budgetary institutional matrix. 
In 1979, the first year the own resources system operated in full, spending 
required a VAT call-up rate of 0.78%. Even in 1978, however, the Commission began 
considering options for future financing, given that rising CAP spending was driving 
total EU spending towards the own resources ceiling defined by the 1% VAT call-up 
rate6. 
In 1980 the VAT call-up rate fell to 0.73% as poor harvests globally lifted 
world commodity prices. Export subsidy spending fell, whilst increased export 
opportunities reduced demand for intervention. Unfortunately the emergence of 
surpluses (the expenditure raising event) was permanent whilst poor harvests (the 
expenditure saving events) were only temporary. The VAT call-up rate thus rose, to 
0.79% in 1981 and 0.92% in 1982. In 1983 the full 1% was claimed, with a further 
ECU 825 million of spending (over 3% of the 1983 total) carried over to the 1984 
budget. This was unsustainable and in both 1984 and 1985 the EU budget, technically 
bankrupt, required additional payments from the member states to keep operating. 
 
5.1 The Fontainebleau Agreements, 1984 
As a result of this budget crisis, 1984 saw the first fundamental reform of the CAP. 
This tackled the dairy sector, then taking over 40% of CAP spending and 30% of total 
EU spending, by introducing production quotas. Thus the member states layered an 
institution into both agricultural and budgetary institutional matrixes imposing, 
indirectly, a limit on this major element of CE. The Fontainebleau European Council 
Summit of June 1984 then approved, inter alia, three key budgetary measures. 
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First, in recognition of concerns over an inequitable distribution of EU budget 
transfers implied by Tables 1 and 2 – and after four years of ad hoc payments – a 
formal rebate mechanism was agreed that would reduce the UK’s net contribution 
each year. Second, agreement was reached to raise the VAT call-up rate to 1.4%, 
notionally to accommodate Portugal and Spain from 1986. This was a budgetary 
institution that could be changed relatively easily – thus the constitutionally-
entrenched BBR was moved. Third, in response to concerns over the unrestrained 
growth in spending, general guidelines were produced for ‘Budgetary Discipline’, 
transformed into rules in December 1984: 
 
• The Council of Finance Ministers should set a reference framework for total 
expenditure, with other Councils asked to ensure their decisions respect this. 
• The growth rate of CAP spending should not exceed the growth rate of own 
resources (the ‘agricultural guideline’). 
• Growth in NCE should respect Article 203 of the Treaty. 
 
This was the first public recognition of the limitations of the initial framework, that 
the BBR required additional, complementary institutions to contain expenditure 
within the own-resources ceiling. The 1984 agreement, however, lacked any 
mechanism to force other Councils, notably CoAM, to respect the spending guideline. 
Moreover, an ongoing dispute between Council and Parliament led the latter to 
interpret the 1984 agreement as unilateral, binding solely on the Council, 
compromising the third element. As a domain constraint, Budgetary Discipline 
remained incomplete. In the words of James Buchanan (Buchanan and Musgrave, 
1999, p. 118), the 1984 agreement may have sought to affect “the set of permissible 
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outcomes or solutions” to the growing budget imbalance, but it had no “agreed-on 
procedures” to enforce the agreed spending limits. 
 
5.2 The Brussels Agreements, 1988 
“The Community is at present faced with a budgetary situation which can only be 
characterised as being on the brink of bankruptcy.”7 Such frankness (albeit lacking 
the word ‘again’) indicated the deep concerns the Commission had about the budget 
situation by 1987. Better organisation was needed on the own resources side of the 
budget, complemented by greater restraint of Compulsory (CAP) Expenditures. As a 
result an “Inner Circle” (Moyer and Josling, 1990, p. 86) of the Budget and 
Agriculture Commissioners, led by Commission President Delors, prepared a package 
of measures, agreement on which was forthcoming in Brussels in February 1988.8 
Some of the measures addressed directly the shortcomings of the 1984 
Budgetary Discipline agreement. The “purely artificial” reference framework from 
1984 (Strasser 1992, p. 210) was transformed into a domain constraint that has 
facilitated the orderly development of EU spending since. This five-year9 Financial 
Perspective set out EU spending in total and disaggregated by main policy area. Total 
spending was to rise but, reflecting new policy priorities, spending on regional policy 
was to double by 1992, to 25% of the total whilst CAP spending, allowed to rise in 
absolute terms, would fall as a percentage of the total. 
To fund this, a controlled rise in the own resources ceiling was negotiated. 
Starting at 1.15% of EU GNP in 1988, it rose to 1.20% in 1992 and continued through 
the second Financial Perspective, to reach 1.27% of GNP in 1999. It has remained at 
this level ever since, although a subsequent technical change sees this sum now 
expressed as 1.24% of Gross National Income.10 Note that this figure is for 
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Commitment Appropriations, which includes money agreed for multi-annual 
programmes; and a margin for unforeseen expenditures. Payment Appropriations 
(spending in the year in question and the amount subject to the BBR) are less.11 Key 
to the implementation of this spending limit was the introduction of a fourth own-
resource, paid by the member states on the basis of relative GNP (now GNI). This 
tops-up the other three own-resources to the specified limit for total own-resources. 
The Financial Perspective was presented through an Interinstitutional 
Agreement (IIA), a device that has become an important element of budgetary 
planning and one that was crucial to the development of the EU Budgetary 
institutional matrix. Parliament and Council clashed regularly over the Budget, so a 
major contribution of the IIA was that it was binding on all members of the Budgetary 
Authority (Commission, Parliament and Council), who all contributed to its 
agreement.12 All three must also agree changes to the Financial Perspective – other 
than annual technical adjustments to real-terms spending limits to allow for inflation 
and GNP growth, thus to determine the actual spending limit each year. 
Furthermore, the Council and Parliament are bound by the rates of increase for 
NCE laid down in the IIA. An interesting feature of the 1988 Financial Perspective 
was that the rise in regional policy spending, following the introduction of “Economic 
and Social Cohesion” into the Treaty via the Single European Act, required a rise in 
NCE above the maximum rate. In the context of the Financial Perspective and IIA, 
this was negotiated without the difficulties of previous years: in order to get member 
states (especially the net contributors) to agree to a larger EU budget, measures had 
been agreed to restore control over spending. 
Thus the limits on EU spending set out in the Financial Perspectives are 
endogenous to the EU budgetary process within the straightjacket of the extant budget 
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rules, notably the BBR. This was the institutional baseline, on top of which these new 
institutions were layered to ensure respect for the BBR, now and into the future. 
Financial Perspectives thereby strengthened both procedural and domain constraints, 
developing significantly the institutional setting of the EU budget process. Monar 
(1984, p. 698) thus argues that “IIAs establish rules and principles which – if 
effectively complied with – will limit the future freedom of action of the institutions”. 
Even so, fundamental problems remained, most notably with the agricultural 
guideline. Even after the 1988 agreement on Budgetary Discipline, it still lacked an 
effective enforcement mechanism, especially regarding the budgetary consequences 
of the agricultural policy decisions taken by CoAM. We thus wish to qualify 
Lindner’s (2003) argument that 1988 represented a new institutional setting: 
The 1988 budget reform was accompanied by the ‘Stabilisers’ reform to the 
CAP. The initial proposal has been for price support levels to be cut should spending 
exceed a certain ‘trigger’ level. This proved unacceptable politically, but a production 
trigger was agreed. When production exceeded a certain level, support prices would 
be cut the following year. This proved inadequate to contain production and spending, 
most notably because CAP support prices were typically 40-60% above world levels, 
yet the maximum possible Stabiliser-induced price cut each year was 3%. 
The basis of support thus remained fundamentally unchanged, as did the 
trajectory of CAP spending.13 As a consequence, even though the 1988 budget reform 
declared that agricultural spending should grow by no more than 74% of the growth 
rate of EU GNP, the member states failed to agree a direct domain constraint, through 
either the budget or agricultural policy reforms, making the enforcement of the 
(budget-related) agricultural guideline after 1988 just as unlikely as before. 
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5.3 The ‘MacSharry’ CAP Reform, 1992 
The growth of EU expenditure had been driven by the ‘Compulsory’ nature of CAP 
spending, combined with the open-ended incentive effects of price support. Neither 
the budgetary nor CAP reforms of the 1980s imposed an effective procedural 
constraint through the definition of Compulsory Expenditure, nor a domain constraint 
on CAP spending. Indeed, the term ‘domain’ is doubly appropriate given that CAP 
spending remained the unchecked domain of CoAM, despite the declarations on 
Budgetary Discipline. By early 1991, when the first reform proposal was prepared, 
the expected CAP overspend was ECU 1.4 bn (Kay, 1998, page 51). A year later, 
production growth led to CoAM facing a proposed (uncompensated) ‘Stabiliser’ price 
cut of 11% (Kay, op cit, page 124). CoAM thus faced the situation that the cost of 
reform was less than the cost of policy stasis. Their resulting reform agreement 
simultaneously (self)-imposed domain constraints on CE and on their budgetary 
freedom. 
The timing and exact nature of the reform were also motivated by pressure on 
the EU through the Uruguay Round of GATT trade talks.14 The decision was taken, 
first, to reduce support prices not by 3% but about 30%. Second, direct payments to 
farmers replaced high prices as the main instrument of farm income support. These 
payments sought to satisfy a key goal of the GATT by de-coupling support from 
production (reducing the extent to which policy support influenced production). It was 
in the design of these payments that the vital institutional change was made. A 
domain constraint was imposed on CAP spending by building a spending limit into 
the direct payments. This simple yet elegant solution was impossible with price 
support and was thus conditional on agreeing new policy instruments. The alternatives 
(agreeing a new definition for CE – requiring a Treaty change – or challenging the 
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classification of CAP spending as Compulsory – raising issues of inter-organisational 
politics) had enormous bargaining costs attached, which acted as a self-reinforcing 
mechanism consistent with path dependency. 
Beef producers receive fixed-value payments, on a limited number of animals. 
Arable area payments also contain two limits. First, the yield figure used to convert 
the per-tonne value (derived from the initial price cut) into a per-hectare payment, is 
fixed using an unchanging reference yield.15 There is also a limit on the area eligible 
for payments. Thus the procedural constraint of CE was adapted indirectly to respect 
the domain constraint of the agricultural guideline, itself introduced to respect the 
domain constraint of the BBR, which had been incorporated in 1988 into the 
procedural constraint of the Financial Perspective. This shows how rules have 
accumulated and been layered, by successive reforms, for mutual reinforcement. 
Having adopted a fine-grained analysis, we can thus offer a qualification to the 
argument of Lindner over the importance of the 1988 budget reforms. Whilst these 
were undoubtedly crucial in shaping the budgetary institutional matrix (see also 
Ackrill 2000a), enforcement of the agricultural guideline built into the Financial 
Perspective required the additional budgetary institution of the eligibility limit on CE, 
embedded within the 1992 CAP reform, to ensure the BBR was respected. 
Whilst we do not disagree with Lindner’s characterisation of the differences 
between the 1970 and 1988 institutional settings (Lindner, 2003, p. 920), we have 
presented a series of arguments that, from a fine-grained perspective, suggest a further 
level of sophistication in the distinction between these two settings. Following the 
BBR laid down in the original Treaty we have shown that, quite unintentionally, the 
introduction of CE saw total EU spending take a trajectory that put it on a direct 
collision-course with the BBR, albeit over a decade later. The additional institutions 
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layered into the budgetary institutional matrix in 1988, along with key elements of the 
1992 CAP reform, ensured the original institution, the BBR, was preserved. Indeed, 
several institutions have been agreed by the member states, in 1988 and subsequently 
(see Section 5.4) to reinforce the BBR and seek to ensure it would not be threatened 
again. In short, the 1970 agreement altered the trajectory of the EU budgetary 
institutional matrix – and the 1988 (and subsequent) reforms restored the original path 
by removing (for the time-being, at least) threats to the BBR. 
In the light of the foregoing discussion, it is also interesting to note the 
observation of Pierson (2004, p. 155) that “[a]rguments about the sources of 
institutional resilience also have significant implications for recent claims about the 
role of political entrepreneurs as drivers of institutional change.” In both 1988 and 
1992, reforms were driven by strong Commissioners, consistent with the view of 
Commission as policy entrepreneur (see also Laffan, 1997). That said, the levels of 
spending agreed for the Financial Perspectives have been driven by the member 
states, through the European Council. In other words, both the Commission and the 
Member States have played crucial roles in preserving the original trajectory of the 
EU budgetary institutional matrix, through the layering-in of additional individual 
institutions at key ‘critical junctures’. 
 
5.4 The Fall and Rise of Binding Constraints: Recent Developments 
As noted earlier, the ceiling on EU spending rose through the first two Financial 
Perspectives. Since 1999, however, it has remained at 1.27% of GNP/1.24% of GNI. 
Laffan and Shackleton (2000, p. 230) suggest this is because further increases “would 
have required ratification by national parliaments and might have prompted 
acrimonious domestic debates on future financing” (see also Laffan 2000, p. 738). 
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Thus again, institutional stability arises from the self-reinforcing mechanism of the 
bargaining costs associated with institutional change. 
The EU budget debate has now shifted – from negotiating more money for 
specific policy priorities (eg regional policy) to maintaining, or even reducing, the 
size of the budget as EU membership rises. In agreeing the Financial Perspective for 
2000-2006 (European Parliament, Council, Commission 1999), the European Council 
reduced the level of spending proposed by the Commission under every heading 
(Laffan and Shackleton, op cit, p. 232). Moreover, whilst the own resources ceiling 
was held at 1.27% of GNP, the margin for unforeseen spending, previously stable at 
about 0.03% of GNP ranged, in the initial Perspective for the EU1516, between 0.08% 
and 0.15% of GNP. Planned spending therefore fell significantly. 
The 1999 IIA also changed the decision-making procedures to make it harder 
for spending to be increased. For an increase less than 0.03% of GNP the Council 
votes by qualified majority, with Parliamentary approval needing a majority of 
members with three-fifths of votes cast. For spending rises greater than 0.03%, 
Parliament and Council must agree, but with the Council acting unanimously. As with 
the original BBR, the political actors involved in decision-making are thus imposing 
additional institutional constraints on their own (and their successors’) actions, to 
contain the overall size of the EU Budget and strengthen still further the institutions 
layered upon and enforcing the BBR. 
Agreed as part of the 2003 CAP reform and effective from 2007, a further 
domain constraint, “Financial Discipline”, has been imposed on CAP spending. If 
forecast CAP spending exceeds planned levels by more than €300 million, the 
Commission must propose cuts to direct payments. This direct control of CAP 
spending was incompatible with the definition of Compulsory Expenditure under 
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price support. With direct payments, the issues of payment eligibility and payment 
level have, de facto, been separated. 
Further tightening of the budget rules were proposed in mid-2004, in the EU 
Constitution. New own resources would require unanimous agreement in the Council 
and the approval of each member state. The Council may act by qualified majority, 
but only if the European Council approves this unanimously. The Financial 
Perspective also requires unanimous Council agreement, although Parliamentary 
approval requires only a simple majority. In short, the EU Constitution confirms 
national vetoes over new own resources and, in particular, over the agreement of 
Financial Perspectives. Change is fundamentally harder to achieve than stasis. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
Historical Institutionalism and path dependency offer an appealing framework within 
which the stability and persistence of policies can be analysed and explained. They 
have, however, struggled to incorporate accounts of change, as represented by policy 
reform. In this paper we have sought to develop the existing literature by focusing on 
one way in which, analytically, change and stasis can co-exist. In order to do this we 
have adopted a fine-grained analysis, observing that a complex policy framework 
consists of multiple inter-related, or layered, institutions. We can thus distinguish 
between change at the level of the individual institution and change at the level of the 
overall policy framework. Indeed, in applying these principles to the EU budget, we 
have analysed both how and why the EU member states agreed ‘reforms’ at the level 
of individual budgetary institutions in order to preserve an unchanged overall policy 
framework. 
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We focus on a series of reforms to EU budgetary institutions from 1970, 
locating them within the continuum of institutional development starting with the 
1957 Treaty of Rome and the Balanced Budget Rule (BBR). Initial institutional 
developments were motivated either directly by obligations laid down in the Treaty of 
Rome (for example establishing ‘own resource’ revenues for the EU budget), or 
indirectly through policy-linkages with other sectors (most notably the establishment 
of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) which, as the principal ‘interventionist’ 
common policy, had the greatest impact on the EU budget). Moreover, in establishing 
the own resources system, the member states introduced a distinction between 
Compulsory and Non-Compulsory Expenditures that prioritised (Compulsory) CAP 
income-support spending over other spending. 
Gradually, the existing policy framework came under pressure, not from an 
exogenous source, as discussed in most of the literature on path dependency, but from 
within. Most notably, the nature of CAP support drove the resulting spending ever-
higher, until total EU spending exceeded the own resources limit that defined the level 
at which the EU Budget should balance. The ‘Budgetary Authority’ (Commission, 
European Parliament and member states, through the Council of Ministers) were 
faced with a choice – new institutions could be agreed that either preserved the 
existing policy framework or set the EU Budget on a new path. 
Path dependency gets its theoretical underpinnings from economic notions of 
positive feedback. One source of positive feedback pressures comes from the costs 
incurred by trying to change extant institutions. With the EU budget, the key 
institutions such as the BBR and the definition of Compulsory Expenditure are 
located in the Treaty of Rome, changes in which require unanimous agreement. 
Moreover, member states cannot all maximise their individual gains from the budget 
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within the zero-sum Budget game that unanimity-voting creates. They can, however, 
agree new institutions that preserve their shares of EU budget transfers. Thus the two 
costs of changing the extant institutions (negotiating costs and the potential loss of 
budgetary transfers) led member states to layer-in institutions that preserved the main 
budgetary institutions and the trajectory of the budgetary framework as a whole. 
We have also shown, through the application of institutional layering, that 
individual institutions can occupy multiple institutional space or policy frameworks. 
In particular, several institutions exist within the frameworks of both the EU Budget 
and the CAP. These linkages are seen most dramatically through the period 1988 to 
1992. The 1988 Budget reform made the BBR more transparent, but neither this 
(including the strengthened rules for ‘Budgetary Discipline’) nor the 1988 CAP 
reform altered the definition of Compulsory Expenditure and the open-ended nature 
of CAP support. As a result, by 1992 the BBR was again threatened by ever-rising 
CAP spending. 
The resulting CAP reform produced the key change in terms of the budgetary 
framework, motivated also by the need to produce a reform breaking the link between 
the level of production and level of support, that would make the CAP more 
acceptable to other countries within the concurrent GATT trade talks. In this reform, 
the definition of Compulsory Expenditure was, de jure, left unchanged but altered, de 
facto, by locating a limit on spending within the new direct income-support payments. 
As a result, the policy framework of the EU Budget was returned to its original 
trajectory, with the BBR underpinned by additional institutions. Recently, the BBR 
has been strengthened further. From 2007, ‘Financial Discipline will require the 
Commission to propose cuts to direct payment levels if spending is forecast to rise 
more than €300 million above the projected levels laid down in the Financial 
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Perspective. Moreover, the EU Constitution has tightened the rules by which spending 
levels can be increased. 
We have thus drawn together, within an historical institutionalist framework, 
the concepts of path dependency and the layering of institutions, in order to propose 
one way by which path dependent processes can experience ‘reform’. We have 
distinguished between change at the levels of the individual institution and the overall 
institutional matrix or policy framework. Applying these ideas to the EU Budgetary 
process, we show how ‘reforms’ have led to the agreement of new institutions that, 
when layered into the extant framework, preserve the trajectory of the latter, 
emphasising in particular continued and strengthened respect for the Balanced Budget 
Rule. Challenges remain for researchers to account for changed trajectories to policy 
frameworks within path dependent processes, but we offer this analysis as a step 
towards this goal. 
 
                                                          
NOTES 
1 Pierson (2004, pp. 35-36), following Mahoney (2001), suggests that whilst ‘increasing returns’ is an 
appropriate term for economics, the alternatives used here are better for political analysis as they 
“avoid any implicit suggestion about efficiency.” 
2 A distinction must be drawn between the setting of a balanced budget and a lack of control over 
spending failing to guarantee balanced budget outcomes. 
3 For details, see pages 377-8 of the fourth (1980) revised edition of the book by Strasser. 
4 This ‘maximum rate’ could be exceeded if one or more of the Parliament, Commission and Council 
believed Community activities needed more funds, but both Council (by qualified majority) and 
Parliament (by majority and 3/5 of votes cast) had to agree. 
5 Ackrill (2000b) analyses CAP reforms from a budgetary perspective. 
6 At this time CAP spending represented 70% of total EU spending in the member states. 
7 Commission of the European Communities (1987, p. 1). 
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8 Key documents are reproduced in Commission of the European Communities (1989). Ackrill 
(2000a); Laffan (2000); and Lindner and Rittberger (2003) analyse various aspects of these reforms. 
9 Each since has been for seven years. 
10 Commission of the European Communities (2001). 
11 In 2005 and 2006, Payment Appropriations for the EU25 (in 2004 prices) total 1.06% of GNI. 
12 Monar (1994, p. 697 and pp. 699ff.) notes that IIAs in other policy areas are not this forceful. 
13 There was a temporary fall in spending in 1989 but, as in 1979, it was caused by a coincident rise in 
world commodity prices. 
14 See, inter alia, Kay (1998); Ackrill (2000b) for more details. 
15 The average of the middle three values for 1986-1990. 
16 Before adjustments were made for a larger enlargement and the switch from GNP to GNI. 
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Table 1 Member State Shares of Own Resource Contributions – Means, Standard 
Deviations and Coefficients of Variation 
Means Bel Dk D El E F Ire It Lux NL Pt UK Aut Fin Swe 
1973-1980 6.6* 1.9 28.4   21.2 0.6* 15.8 0.1* 9.0*  16.2    
1981-1985 5.2 2.1 28.1 1.5  19.7 1.1 13.3 0.2 7.0  21.8*    
1986-1994 4.3 2.1 28.2 1.4 7.5 19.9 0.9 14.8 0.2 6.5 1.2 13.0    
1995-2002 3.9 2.0 26.4 1.6 7.2 17.3* 1.2 12.6 0.2* 6.3 1.4 13.0 2.5 1.4 2.8 
1973-1988 5.8 2.1 28.1 1.4 6.1* 20.8 0.8 14.7 0.2 7.9 0.9* 17.7    
1989-2002 4.0 2.0 27.4 1.5 7.6 18.1 1.0 13.7 0.2 6.3 1.4 12.7 2.5 1.4 2.8 
1973-2002 5.0 2.0 27.8 1.5 7.4 19.5 0.9 14.3 0.2 7.2 1.3 15.3 2.5 1.4 2.8 
                
Std Dev                
1973-2002 1.1 0.3 2.3 0.2 1.1 2.0 0.3 2.2 0.0 1.2 0.3 4.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 
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CoV                
1973-1980 6.6 24.3 4.7   11.5 38.0 17.3 16.2 5.8  28.6    
1981-1985 4.8 8.8 2.5 13.7  2.3 11.9 7.1 16.1 2.9  7.6    
1986-1994 7.3 11.1 9.7 20.6 17.2 6.2 9.0 10.7 15.3 4.0 26.7 19.4    
1995-2002 4.6 5.7 11.1 5.4 13.6 3.6 16.9 12.8 13.3 4.8 7.8 15.4 5.9 5.5 7.1 
1973-1988 16.1 18.1 4.2 23.3 18.1 8.9 36.5 15.6 18.5 14.5 8.4 25.3    
1989-2002 5.3 5.4 11.5 8.9 12.7 6.4 20.4 15.3 16.3 4.2 14.1 17.7 5.9 5.5 7.1 
1973-2002 22.8 13.9 8.3 15.1 15.4 10.4 31.2 15.6 23.9 16.4 19.8 28.4 5.9 5.5 7.1 
Notes: * outliers – observations where the sub-period mean lies outside the range of 
full-period mean plus/minus one full-period standard deviation. 
 Data sources – Table 1 plus own calculations. 
 
 
Table 2 Member State Shares of EU Expenditures – Means, Standard Deviations and 
Coefficients of Variation 
Means Bel Dk D El E F Ire It Lux NL Pt UK Aut Fin Swe 
1976-1980 5.8* 5.6* 20.2*   20.5 4.8 17.2 0.1 11.4*  14.4    
1981-1985 3.7 3.7 16.3 5.4*  20.2 5.1 18.7* 0.0 8.7  18.1*    
1986-1994 3.7 3.2 14.1 7.5 12.0 18.6 5.0 15.1 0.3 7.6 3.8 9.2    
1995-2002 2.8 2.2 14.4 7.6 17.7 17.1 4.1 12.0* 0.2 2.9* 5.2 9.0 1.9 1.5 1.6 
1976-1992 4.2 4.1 16.6 6.3 11.3 19.7 5.0 17.1 0.1 9.4 3.2 13.4    
1993-2002 3.2 2.3 14.2 7.9 17.0 17.3 4.2 12.1* 0.3 3.3* 5.3 8.9 1.9 1.5 1.6 
1976-2002 3.8 3.4 15.7 7.0 14.7 18.8 4.7 15.2 0.2 7.1 4.4 11.7 1.9 1.5 1.6 
                
Std Dev                
1976-2002 1.3 1.2 2.8 1.5 3.9 2.3 0.8 3.0 0.2 3.4 1.4 4.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 
                
CoV                
1976-1980 12.1 10.1 16.8   15.4 23.2 7.4 37.2 5.2  19.8    
1981-1985 10.1 8.3 8.5 31.1  9.4 13.1 6.7 29.3 3.3  19.7    
1986-1994 31.9 16.0 8.4 17.6 26.3 10.6 12.0 15.1 108.1 34.5 43.8 11.9    
1995-2002 18.7 12.0 5.0 8.1 11.9 4.2 12.7 11.7 18.5 21.4 10.2 11.1 14.2 14.0 11.5 
1976-1992 32.0 27.0 19.2 24.7 28.8 12.5 15.5 10.0 130.7 21.2 43.2 33.8    
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1993-2002 26.7 14.7 6.2 10.4 13.4 5.0 13.5 14.6 87.5 27.6 10.2 11.3 14.2 14.0 11.5 
1976-2002 33.3 36.4 17.9 20.9 26.8 12.3 17.0 19.6 112.5 48.3 31.9 35.9 14.2 14.0 11.5 
Notes: See Table 2. 
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